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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
olsolete; (2) some relief measure similar to that passed after the Hallock
case.18 This step should be taken, in all fairness, at least in those cases where
the decedent has created the trust before 1931 and has refrained from relin-
quishing his life estate in reliance upon Supreme Court decisions and Treasury
regulations.
VENUE-EFFECT OF THE NEW JUDICIAL CODE ON THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT
In a suit under the Federal Employer's Liability Act by an employee of
the defendant railroad company to recover damages for injuries sustained by
him during the course of his employment, the defendant moved for an order
transferring the cause to the United States District Court in Ohio, where the
injuries occurred, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. A, § 1404(a).' Venue under the
FELA 2 is in the district where the defendant resides, or in which the cause
of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of
commencing the action. Section 1404(a) provides in essence that a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district where the action might
have been brought, for convenience of parties or in the interest of justice. Held,
motion denied, Section 1404(a) is not applicable to actions brought under
the FEI.A. Pascarella v. New York Cent. R. R., 81 F. Supp. 95 (E. D. N. Y.
1948).
Section 1404(a) of the new Judicial Code is similar to the doctrine of
forum non conveniens 3 which is enforced in the federal courts. 4 However, as
to actions brought under the FELA the doctrine has not been applied. It has
been held that once the criteria of venue is satisfied, an action under the FELA
should not be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, that venue
in the FELA is an inherent part of the employer's liability, 6 that the venue
right given to a plaintiff under the FELA should not be limited or abridged, 7
and that the privilege of venue conferred by the FELA is absolute.8 In
Baltimore & Ohio R. R, v. Kepner 0 the railroad sought in an Ohio court to
enjoin Kepner from prosecuting an action in a federal court in New York.
18. See T. D. 5008 (1940) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 105. § 18.17 (1934 ed).
1. Based on 36 STAT. 1103 (1911), 39 SrAT. 851 (1916), 28 U. S. C., §§ 119, 163
(1940).
2. 36 STAT. 291 (1910), as amended, 36 STAr. 1167 (1911), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1940).
3. "The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute." See Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501, 507 (1947).
4. Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, supra.
5. Butts v. Southern Pac. R. R., 69 F. Supp. 895 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
6. Akerly v. New York Cent. R, R., 168 F.2d 812 (C. C. A. 6th 1948).
7. Stierhoff v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 8 F. R. D. 54 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
8. Sacco v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 56 F. Supp. 959 (E. D. N. Y. 1944).
9. 314 U. S. 44 (1941).
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The cause of action arose under the FELA due to an accident in Ohio. The
Supreme Court held that the FELA privilege of venue could not be frustrated.
It is, therefore, definite that before Section 1404(a) became effective 10 hardship
or inconvenience to the defendant in FELA actions played no part in deter-
mining venue under that act.
Thus, the venue right under the FELA could only be defeated by congres-
sional action. 11 In the principal case the application of Section 1404(a) to cases
under the FELA was treated as a matter of, congressional intent; the court
discussed at length the fact that the Jennings Bill,12 which was designed to
limit the power of the plaintiff to select venue under the FE LA, was also before
the 80th Congress at the same time as the new Judicial Code. The bill was
passed by the House, 13 but died in committee 14 in the Senate. From this legis-
lative history the court inferred that congressional intent, as to Section 1404 (a),
was not to disturb venue under the FELA. The difficulty with such an approach
to congressional intent is the multiplicity of reasons why any particular legis-
lation may fail to be enacted.
Section 1404(a) is recent, 15 and in prior cases congressional intent has been
construed to require its application to venue under the FELA. While a recent
case denied the motion of the defendant to transfer an FE-,LA cause to another
district, the court indicated that it would transfer such a cause upon timely
motion where retention would work an injustice on the defendant, this type
motion being directed to the discretion of the court.', It has been determined
that under Section 1404(a) the fact that the defendant would have to bring
witnesses some 400 miles is enough to remove the cause to another district in
which it could originally have been brought.' 7 The same conclusion has been
reached on the ground that the words "any civil action" in Section 1404(a)
include an action under the FELA, and the suggestion that 1404(a) is merely
a statutory enactment of the doctrine of forum non conveniens has been
rejected.' 8 In White v. Thompson 19 and Nunn v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P.
& P. R. R. 2O it was held that congress intended Section 1404(a) to apply
since the reviser's notes 21 to that section stated that it was drafted in accord-
ance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, to allow a transfer to a more
convenient forum even though the venue is proper. As an example of the need
10. Sept. 1, 1948.
I1. Leet v. Union Pac. R. R, 25 Cal.2d 605, 155 P,2d 42 (1945), cert. denied, 325
U. S. 866 (1945).
12. 93 CONG. REc. 7348 (1947) (H. R. 1639).
13. 93 CoNG. Rrc. 9193 (1947).
14. 93 CONG. REc. 9249 (1947).
15. Approved June 25, 1948.
16. Brainard v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R., 81 F. Supp. 211 (N. D. III. 1948).
17. Chaffin v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 80 F. Supp. 957 (E. D. N. Y. 1948).
18. Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 79 F. Supp. 821 (D. Minn. 1948).
19. 80 F. Supp. 411 (N. D. I11. 1948).
20. 80 F. Supp. 745 (S. D, N, Y. 1948).
21. Tit. 28, U. S. C., Cong. Serv., P 1853 (1948).
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for such a provision the reviser's notes cited the Kepner case, mentioning that
it was brought under the FFLA and prosecuted in New York although the
accident occurred in Ohio. The use of the Kepner case to illustrate the need
of Section 1404 (a) is of great im)ortance in determining congressional intent
since the reviser's notes were considered by the congress. 22
Since the FELA merely provides where an action may be brought and
does not provide that the action must remain, it is possible to construe Section
1404(a) and the FEI.A as being consistent. 28 There is no particular reason
why FELA cases should now he treated differently from other cases. 24 The
court apparently placed too much weight on the fact that the Jennings Bill, a
separate piece of legislation, failed to le enacted by congress. The reviser's
notes would seem a more appropriate source for ascertaining congressional
intent as to the application of Section 1404(a).
WILLS - "OR HIS ESTATE" AS WORDS OF SUBSTITUTION
PREVENTING LAPSE OF BEQUEST
Testator executed a holographic will devising certain property to Specter
"or his estate." The donee, who was unrelated to the testator, predeceased
hin. The bequeathed property was sold ; and by decree of the lower court the
proceeds were awarded to the heirs of deceased donee Specter. From this
decree, the executors of testator appealed. Held, since the words "or his estate"
(lid not indicate that the testator intended to substitute the donee's heirs in his
place and thus prevent lapse of the bequest, the testamentary gift to the donee
lapsed upon his death. Decree reversed. In re Brinet's Estate, 200 P2d 59
(Cal. 1949).
In the absence of statute, a testamentary gift lapses if the beneficiary
thereof predeceases the testator unless the bequest manifests the testator's
intent to substitute another in place of the deceased donee.' Recent statutes
modify this common law rule in order to prevent lapse and permit devolution
of the gift to the heirs of the donee even though the bequest does not expressly
sutlstitute them in his place if the deceased donee was within a specified degree
of relationship to the testator.2 But where the donee was a stranger in blood,
22. See H1. R. Rm'. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A132 (1948).
23. White v. Thompson, supra.
24. Nunn v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. R. R., spra.
1. In rc Simpson's Estate, 304 Pa. 396, 156 Atl. 91 (1931) ; Equitable Trust Co. v.
Banning, 17 Del. Ch. 95, 149 Atl. 432 (1930); Bryson v. Holbrook, 159 Mass. 280, 34
N. E. 270 (1893) ; see Nelson v. Meade, 120 Me. 61, 149 AUt. 626, 628 (1930).
2. "If a devisee or legatee dies during the lifetime of the testator, the testamentary dis-
position to him fails, unless an intention appears to substitute another in his place; except
that when any estate is devised or bequeathed to any kindred of the testator, and the de-
visee or legatee (lies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, . . . such descendants
take the estate so given by the will in the same manner as the devisee or legatee would have
